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ABSTRACT 
The prevailing trend in the historiography of American Catholicism has been an implicit 
acceptance of the traditional liberal narrative as formulated by scholars like Louis Hartz.  
American Catholic historians like Jay Dolan and John McGreevy have incorporated this 
narrative into their studies and argue that America was inherently liberal and that the 
conservative Catholics who rejected liberalism were thus fundamentally anti-American.  This has 
simplified nuanced and complex relationships into a story of simple opposition.  Further, the 
social justice doctrine of the Catholic Church, although based on undeniably illiberal 
foundations, led conservatives to come to the same conclusions about social and economic 
reform as did twentieth-century liberal reformers.  These shared ideas about social reform, 
though stemming from conflicting foundations and looking toward vastly different goals, 
allowed conservative Catholics to play a role in what are seen as some of the most sweeping 
liberal reforms of the twentieth-century.      
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 The history of Roman Catholicism in the United States is one of conflict, at times 
consensus, and, above all, it is a story about how a diverse group of people united only by a 
common faith have navigated the murky waters of American culture.  The names and faces 
changed over time but they shared a remarkably similar understanding of the relationship 
between the obligations of their faith and the demands of citizenship.  Many took to heart St. 
Paul’s exhortation to the Philippians and argued that although they were loyal American citizens, 
their true citizenship was in heaven and it was therefore primarily the mission of the Church that 
guided their actions on earth.1  Conservative Catholics were particularly ardent in this regard.  
They sought to reinforce the hierarchy’s authority in defining precisely what that mission was 
through dictating the norms of the community.  As the political and cultural landscape evolved 
over the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, conservatives found themselves at once at 
odds and in agreement with the dominant visions of American political culture.  Their 
commitment to the dictates of their faith, and the hierarchy’s authority in presenting that faith to 
the world, colored the way in which they reacted to these transformations, which resulted in a 
layered and paradoxical relationship with American society.   
Historians as a whole have struggled to understand conservative Catholicism and even 
historians of American Catholicism have misunderstood the relationship of conservative 
Catholics to the American polity.  Jay Dolan, a leading historian of Catholicism, has 
characterized conservative ideology as existing solely in opposition to American liberalism.  In 
making this argument, Dolan suggests that American political history has been dominated by 
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liberalism’s notions of individual autonomy and the inclusivity of diverse peoples under the 
banner of a common American civic identity.  It is undeniably true that Catholic conservatism 
exhibited highly illiberal elements, but his narrative acknowledges neither the illiberal nature of 
American culture nor the ways in which conservative Catholic ideology came to share in the 
goals of liberal reform.  John McGreevy, another important figure in the field of Catholic history, 
presents a similar, though more ideologically subtle, view of conservative Catholics and their 
relationship with American political culture.  According to McGreevy, the conservative rejection 
of individual autonomy “informed Catholic hostility” towards liberal movements and policies 
like immediate slave emancipation and laissez-faire economics.2  McGreevy writes of the 
trajectories of American and Catholic history as “two traditions in motion,” though somehow 
unconnected.3 
The problem with such an argument is that, in addition to misrepresenting conservative 
Catholics, liberalism has never been the hegemonic ideology in America that many historians 
have pretended it to be.  As such, it is important to develop a more textured understanding of 
American history that takes conflict and inconsistencies into account.  As Rogers Smith has 
argued, although there is a liberal thread through American political history, it has been braided 
with what Smith calls an ascriptive thread.  By ascriptive, he means that there exist certain 
qualities defined by society to which one must adhere to be accepted as a member in this civic 
and cultural order.  Over time, these qualities have variously been the acceptance of a common 
political ideology, civic identity, or a shared cultural heritage.4  Noah Pickus likewise strives to 
                                                 
2
 John T. McGreevy, Catholicism and American Freedom: A History (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2003), 13. 
3
 Ibid., 15. 
4
 On the multiple traditions thesis, see Rogers M. Smith, Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in 
U.S. History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).  Other scholars have likewise rejected the liberal narrative. 
See Noah Pickus, True Faith and Allegiance: Immigration and American Civic Nationalism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2005); Linda K. Kerber, No Constitutional Right to be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of 
 3 
rewrite the liberal narrative, though in some contrast to Smith.  He argues that while Smith 
portrays liberalism as the ideal, appeals to communal solidarity should not always be viewed as a 
destructive or inhibiting force.  At times, they could even be seen as a way to develop and 
promote the civic principles that unite the country.5        
Both of these scholars, as well as many of their contemporaries, are seeking to rewrite the 
American narrative to incorporate the wide variety of ways in which Americans have striven to 
create and define their civic identity.  Once we rewrite the American narrative so that it is no 
longer dominated by liberalism, the traditional understanding of American Catholicism within 
that narrative also changes.  Conservative Catholics did indeed reject liberalism, but they did so 
in a wider context not dominated by liberalism.  In their rejection of liberalism, they actually 
shared in the illiberal and ascriptive trends of American history, particularly during the Gilded 
Age.  They focused on promoting hierarchical authority in order to strengthen and define the 
boundaries of the Catholic community.  Many bishops, particular conservatives like Archbishop 
Michael Corrigan and Bishop Bernard McQuaid in the nineteenth-century, honed in on the 
parochial school as one of the essential building blocks in the Catholic community.  Through 
Catholic schooling, children would grow up and learn in an atmosphere saturated with their faith.  
In contrast to parochial schools, priests and prelates alike saw the public school system as the 
gateway to schism due to its refusal to accept the Church’s authority.  This suspicion of public 
institutions opened up into broader concerns about certain civic rights, like freedom of speech 
and worship.  Conservatives, particularly those in positions of power, were wary of allowing the 
faithful to freely indulge in and promote such civic doctrines lest their authority be undermined 
in the process.  Indeed, even as Pope Leo XIII could decry the plight of the worker and call for 
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social reform, he also soundly denounced the promotion of any liberal reform within the Church 
itself. 
The Church’s insistence upon its infallible authority to dictate the moral law, however, 
also led to a commitment to the doctrine of social justice.  This dedication to social justice, 
though based on essentially illiberal grounds, presents an interesting paradox.  The conservative 
emphasis on authority coincided with a devotion to the traditions of their faith; a faith that has 
historically highly prized social justice.  This doctrine became especially relevant in the modern 
period with the 1891 promulgation of Leo XIII’s groundbreaking encyclical, Rerum Novarum.  
In it, Leo exhorted Catholics to work to bring about justice for the worker, even as he also 
cautioned against socialist and liberal reform.  His encyclical applied the perennial Catholic 
commitment to community to the modern plight of the industrial wage-worker.  The impact of 
the encyclical was almost immediate.  By the opening years of the twentieth-century, Catholic 
thinkers and activists were already hailing Rerum Novarum as their call to action.  Its 
prescriptions for alleviating the social ills that had the greatest impact on workers seemed to fall 
in line with the growing liberal reform movements that culminated in the New Deal reforms of 
the 1930’s.  Because of these similarities, conservatives could work for the same reforms as the 
New Dealers, and twentieth-century liberals more broadly.  Rather bizarrely, conservatives found 
themselves enmeshed in the New Deal coalition, the members of which have traditionally been 
heralded as the great victors of twentieth-century liberalism. 
The social justice tradition of the Catholic Church grew out of Thomas Aquinas’ writings 
on moral virtue as found in his thirteenth-century work, Summa Theologica.  This Thomistic 
understanding of social justice and morality was most clearly articulated for the nineteenth and 
twentieth century world by Leo XIII in Rerum Novarum.  These are the foundations that clearly 
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separated conservatives from liberal reformers, despite their similar reform goals.  Modern 
liberalism, as it moved from the nineteenth into the twentieth century, began to eschew the 
hands-off approach to liberty and, instead, focused on using the state and the community to 
further the rights of the individual.  Catholics did want the state to intervene in order to protect 
those who could not protect themselves and they certainly felt that a strong community provided 
stability for the society.  However, as the pope argued in his encyclical, conservative Catholics 
held that “no practical solution” for curing social ills “will be found apart from the intervention 
of religion and of the Church.”6  Leo continued, writing that “We affirm without hesitation that 
all the striving of men will be vain if they leave out the Church.”7  It was, for conservatives, 
absolutely and without doubt essential that in order to effect true social reform, each and every 
person had to obey the Church.  In the minds of conservatives, that was the ultimate end for 
reform.  Not, as liberals argued, individual freedom, but obedience to the Church and, as a result, 
the salvation of souls.   
Taking these rather monumental differences into account, it becomes even more difficult 
to understand how conservatives could be, by the standards of secular society, so very illiberal 
and yet, even from those illiberal foundations, form the same ideas about reform as did their 
liberal contemporaries.  It is these inconsistencies and contradictions that inform the conservative 
approach to American culture.  They worked from a foundation considered to be irreconcilably 
and irrefutably illiberal and yet found grounds upon which they could work in tandem and 
engage with a movement so keen on the protection of the individual.  Indeed, it was their very 
insistence upon maintaining a faithful obedience to their Church that helped to shape the way in 
which the doctrine of social justice was applied to the American cultural landscape.  Contrary to 
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the liberal Catholic movement for Americanization and what conservatives saw as the dangerous 
cultural compromise that it required, conservatives wanted to preserve a strict adherence to the 
traditions and teachings of the Catholic Church as a basis for building their relationship with 
American culture.  That relationship, though often strained, resulted in a peculiar partnership 
with their ideological opponents as each sought, for their own reasons, to work for the common 






































 The lives of nineteenth-century Americans were characterized by constant fluctuation, 
uncertainty, and instability.  In the latter half of the nineteenth century alone, the United States 
experienced a massive influx of European immigration, a bloody Civil War, the end of slavery, 
and what many believed to be a failed attempt at the reconstruction of the country in the war’s 
aftermath.  The industrialization and urbanization of the nation surged ahead while the conditions 
of workers – both in and out of the factory – plummeted to new depths of poverty and 
degradation.  Despite the appalling and seemingly incurable conditions of wage-earners, some 
still propounded a sense of self-determination, of pulling oneself up by one’s bootstraps.  This 
was the very definition of the active spirit of the American population, a spirit, it was argued, 
that needed to be exported to the oppressed masses of Europe as well as inculcated within the 
Old World’s emigrants to the New.   
 American Catholics held a particular stake in how this story would unfold.  The vast 
majority of lay Catholics in the United States at this time were both immigrants and members of 
the working class.  In addition to the millions of Irishmen who had flooded the nation during the 
height of the Potato Famine, Italian immigrants began to join the already beleaguered immigrant 
class.  The bulk of these Irish and Italian immigrants were Catholic and their poor station in life 
led some native-born Americans to deride the foreigners for not only their cultural and ethnic 
differences, but their religious differences as well.  Catholicism came to be seen as the religion of 
aliens and one that was wholly inconsistent with liberal American principles of democracy and 
freedom.  They argued that Catholics’ every thought and action was controlled by the Church 
 8 
and that, should the pope order it, these dormant treasonous foreigners would rise up and install 
an authoritarian theocracy.  In furtherance of this goal, these immigrants would, it was claimed, 
mindlessly vote as a block based solely on religious grounds and upon the instructions of their 
parish priests.  Unfounded though that accusation may have been, organizations like Tammany 
Hall certainly did nothing to quell the fears of a Catholic coup.  As a whole, Catholics were seen 
as a threat to the moral purity of the nation as well as a danger to the tenuous stability of society.8 
In spite of this, Catholics did not simply allow themselves to be marginalized by the 
Protestant mainstream, but their response was not unified.  Liberal Catholics wanted to 
appropriate the American spirit that anti-Catholics claimed set true Americans aside from false.  
They could, it was argued, feed their faith through the tenets of liberalism and democracy, which 
they saw as the dominant ideology in the American cultural and political landscape, and create a 
new Catholicism that had a comfortable home in American society.  This new version of the old 
faith could then be used to modernize the whole Church under the guidance of the new American 
Catholic spirit.  Conservatives, by contrast, rejected the Protestant ethic and liberal political 
values that they felt had led to the then-current ills of society.  Their rejection was based upon 
the belief that unrestrained individualism led to social disunity and fragmentation.  In 
uncompromisingly upholding the faith, they would, essentially, save American society from 
itself.  Liberal Catholics argued that the benefits of adaptation and appropriation far outweighed 
the risks.  Through their acceptance of American culture, they could effectively staunch the flow 
of criticism and anti-Catholicism from nativists as well as revive what they saw as the decaying 
devotionalism of Old World Catholicism.  The ends of both conservatives and liberals were 
identical: both sought the betterment of mankind and the proliferation of the Catholic faith.  
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Conservatives claimed that the liberal plan would irreversibly compromise the faith, while 
liberals argued that the conservative approach was insular and out of touch with the modern 
world.9   
Conservatives objected to the liberal plan of attack on two points.  First, they claimed that 
any adaptation of the faith to secular culture would promote indifferentism to religious 
differences.  As conservatives understood it, it was Protestantism that had initially and inevitably 
led to secularization and the crumbling moral order due to the Protestant rejection of the 
Church’s authority.  They claimed that Catholics needed to avoid at all costs the possibility of 
compromise on the basis of Church teachings and principles; otherwise, they too would end up in 
schism.  Conservative American bishops, Bishop Bernard McQuaid of Rochester in particular, 
saw strictly Catholic organizations, such as parochial schools, as a way to battle this threat.  In 
this way, they could, through the promotion of a strong Catholic identity, prevent their flocks 
from converting to a Protestant sect or, even worse, from defecting altogether and joining a 
socialist movement.  And second, the liberal approach to reform was argued to be inconsonant 
with Church teachings.  Conservatives believed true reform could only occur as a result of slow 
deliberation on the part of the whole Church.  Liberal reform, they argued, emerged from 
individual opinions and cultural trends, rather than through the unerring work of the Holy Spirit.  
And, in a more concrete sense, they claimed that this type of reform would lead to a rejection of 
hierarchical authority, thus resulting in the weakening of Catholic moral authority.  It was a 
highly illiberal stance, to be sure, and while the dominant ideology of the Gilded Age was far 
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from liberal itself, Catholics of any stripe remained to be cultural and political outsiders in an era 
striving to counteract the immigrant threat.10 
By the mid-1880’s, the liberal contingent had coalesced into a distinct reform movement.  
Three men in particular were at the forefront of what would come to be known as the 
Americanism movement: Archbishop John Ireland of St. Paul, Bishop John Keane of Richmond 
and the first rector of the Catholic University of America, and Monsignor Denis O’Connell, the 
rector of the North American Pontifical College in Rome.  These men, taken together, crafted a 
movement through which they could create for the universal Church a version of Catholicism 
based upon their American model.  Their vision was founded upon a firm belief in American 
exceptionalism that included not only cultural hegemony, but ecclesiastical superiority as well.  
According to Americanist opinion, the European Church was in decline and because, as they 
understood it, America had already embraced the best of modernity, the American Church would 
thus be the best hope for the future of Catholicism.  Bishop Keane believed that “the Church in 
America is to exercise a dominant influence in the world’s future” and that “the Old World has 
many lessons to learn from the New.”11  Ireland himself wrote that “[t]he spirit of American 
liberty wafts its spell across seas and oceans, and prepares distant continents for the implanting 
of American ideas and institutions.”12   
For the Americanists, the Catholicism of the Old World was characterized by passivity 
and submissiveness.  It was believed to be, as Archbishop Ireland put it, a “pusillanimous and 
self-satisfied sanctuary religion.”13   The independent spirit of America, they argued, created a 
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desire for an active participation in the life of the Church that could revive what they saw as the 
outmoded medieval piety of European Catholics.  This did not necessarily mean that they felt 
that the role of the laity in the bureaucratic processes of the Church needed to be expanded.  
However, they did believe that it was the obligation of Catholics to escape the ghettos of 
conservative Catholicism that prevented them from an active engagement with both their own 
faith and the world.  They co-opted the nineteenth century belief in American geographical and 
ideological expansion and adapted it to their arguments concerning the need to renew the faith of 
all Catholics through the lessons of the American Church. 
 Not, of course, that they believed that the American Church had already fully taken these 
lessons to heart.  However, it was through an emersion in what they saw as the dominantly 
liberal American culture that would smooth the process.  Bishop Keane felt that democracy 
“represent[ed] an Ideal that hath ever been close to [Jesus’] Heart, and that shaped [His] Own life 
on earth.”14  In this light, it was only right that Catholics should embrace the tenets of democracy 
just as their own savior had done.  Liberals understood the advent of global democracy to be 
inevitable and thus saw no reason to reject it as their conservative co-religionists had done.  
Through the tyranny and corruption of its monarchies, Europe had lost its ability to guide the rest 
of the world into modernity.  It was only natural, then, that America would have to take on that 
burden.  American Catholics were thus obliged to shoulder this burden in order to help their Old 
World brethren emerge from their Catholic ghettos.  As Archbishop Ireland claimed in an 1888 
sermon, “[w]estward, it has been said, the start of empire moves.  Westward, methinks, moves 
too, the apocalyptic candlestick.”15  
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 Given the Gilded Age movement toward cultural homogeneity and the deep tensions that 
divided nativists and immigrants, one can see why Catholics would want to make an effort to 
engage American culture on its own terms for purely practical reasons.  The priests and prelates 
of the Americanism movement could not have been blind to the suffering of their immigrant 
flocks.  Their remedy for those Catholics was to allow their faith to become acculturated to its 
American surroundings, rather than clinging to the Old World practices that alienated them from 
their fellow citizens.  It was, ironically, this perceived need to promote the ideals of democracy 
and liberalism that illustrates how illiberal the country was, particularly in this period.  The 
golden promise of capitalism in the aftermath of a failed reconstruction effort created an era in 
which the White Anglo-Saxon Protestant ideal once more gained ascendancy as wealth 
continued to accumulate in fewer and fewer hands.  As the egalitarian hopes of Reconstruction 
faded, an ever-increasing pressure – whether or not it was acknowledged – was placed upon 
outsiders to conform.  The liberal Catholics who crusaded for the reform of their Church in the 
Gilded Age did so within these confines.  As they continued to believe in liberalism as the 
fundamental American ideology, they were seemingly unaware of the patently illiberal trends 
that sprang up in the wake of Reconstruction.  In their defense, it is surely not surprising, given 
that historians themselves are only beginning to overturn the traditional liberal narrative, even 
with over a century of hindsight.16 
 Conservative Catholics were no less confined by the times.  Their cure, however, was to 
reject the ideology that they felt had led to the deteriorating social and political conditions.  The 
widespread political corruption that came during and in the aftermath of Reconstruction was, in 
their minds, due to previously unrestrained liberalism and the loss of moral authority that had 
inevitably resulted from the Protestant roots of the nation.  As Bishop McQuaid and other 
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conservatives argued, because Protestantism was a religion based on private interpretation of 
revelation, it could have no divine or infallible truths and would therefore only lead to division 
and unavoidable decay.  As a result, any country in which Protestantism was a driving force in 
the cultural landscape would doom itself to not only secularism, but also to disorder and 
destruction.  The inhumane treatment of wage-earners and, they argued, the selfishness of the 
barons of capitalism were a direct result of founding a nation upon Protestant principles.  
Therefore, it was absolutely necessary to formulate a new solution to the problem.  For 
conservatives, the acceptance of the system by their liberal co-religionists would only help to 
perpetuate its evils and even allow its corruption to enter the Church.  Their answer was to 
emphasize and strengthen the Church’s ability to infallibly define the moral boundaries of 
mankind.  Their prescriptions were undeniably illiberal; conservatives were wary of unrestrained 
freedom of speech and worship and found nineteenth century liberalism lacking in the kind of 
centralized authority and power needed to enforce moral virtue.17 
 This solution required the restoration of Catholic Christian morality to the state and to the 
political life of the country.  As Pope Leo XIII argued in 1881, “the divine power of the Christian 
religion has given birth to excellent principles of stability and order for the State.”18  The 
Catholic doctrine on the origin of civil power taught that God and God alone conferred the right 
to rule.  The social contract was, according to Leo, “a falsehood and a fiction, and … it has no 
authority to confer on political power such great force, dignity, and firmness as the safety of the 
State and the common good of the citizens require.”19  Government and society could find these 
guarantees when it understood that the realization of these goals could only occur once God had 
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been universally accepted as the only true source of civil power.  This acceptance, it was argued, 
could be reached more easily through the recognition of the Catholic Church as the source of 
moral authority and divine revelation.  As Leo wrote, “[a]ll nations which have yielded to her 
sway have become eminent by their gentleness, their sense of justice, and the glory of their high 
deeds.”20  The pontiff, and other conservatives, did not make the claim that democratic nations 
were incapable of achieving these goals, but they did feel that democracy carried within it a 
rejection of absolute hierarchical authority.  As such, the goals of justice and social stability 
would be all the more difficult to achieve without that same authority guiding the way in which 
the moral law was passed on to its citizens.    
It is this reasoning that fueled the conservative claim that Catholics could best serve 
American society by retaining their Catholicity.  They wanted Catholics to emphasize their 
internal unity and to foster a strong sense of community through maintaining Catholic 
institutions.  Conservatives argued that the uniquely Catholic emphasis on community as defined 
by the Church could create a sense of social obligation.  The individualism of Protestantism and 
liberalism, they argued, could only create a society in which each person acted in their own self-
interest.  Though most did not consider democracy to be the most ideal system of government for 
the proliferation of Catholicism, they contended that their faith was not only compatible with 
American citizenship, but that it could also be a positive good for American society.  One such 
conservative, Monsignor Thomas Preston, the Vicar General of the Archdiocese of New York, 
argued that “[i]n discharging our duty faithfully towards God, in maintaining, as we are bound to 
do, the truths which He has revealed, and the integrity of our faith, we subserve in the best 
possible manner the interests of our country, the preservation of true liberty and the perpetuity of 
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our free institutions.”21  Of course, by true liberty, Monsignor Preston did not mean the kind of 
liberty espoused by liberals.  The liberal goal of individual liberty clashed with the Catholic 
belief that the individual should give up his own personal freedoms in order to best serve the 
community.  
He, along with his contemporaries like Bishop McQuaid and Archbishop Michael 
Corrigan of New York, claimed that American society was languishing in secularism and 
infidelity because of the deleterious effects and inherent relativism of Protestantism.  Through 
strict adherence to their faith, which, they argued, could be enforced most successfully by the 
American episcopacy, and its emphasis on the obligation to act in the common good, they could 
preserve the Union better than any Protestant or atheist ever could.  The underlying, and often 
unspoken, implication of this argument, however, was that through strictly adhering to their 
faith, others would be moved to conversion.  A Catholic nation founded upon the Church’s 
divine authority was the ultimate goal, but even conservatives were wary of publicly announcing 
such an objective.  
As liberal Catholics urged the Americanization of the churches, conservatives sought to 
reject both liberalizing trends, which emphasized the sanctity of the individual, as well as the 
labor impulse toward socialism, which emphasized communal obligation in light of industrial 
wealth.  The politics of class espoused by socialism were surely attractive to the immigrant 
workers who found themselves helplessly trapped in what amounted to nothing more than wage 
slavery.  Further compounding the issue, the conspicuous consumption of the Gilded Age helped 
to highlight the growing stratification between the socioeconomic classes.  The socialist appeal 
to the working class thus prompted nervous clergymen to clarify the Church’s position on the 
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relationship and the system of obligations between the classes as well as the need to keep God 
and the Church at the center of one’s life.  Although socialism had at its center the notion of a 
communal bond, its emphasis on the inherent tension between the classes and the rejection of 
religion put it wholly at odds with the definition of community and morality as propounded by 
the Church.  The moral virtue found in Christianity, and, more specifically, Roman Catholicism, 
was the only way to maintain the health of the community and to encourage it to promote what 
the Church saw as the true eschatological goal of man: the salvation of souls.  For the Church, 
conservatives claimed, socialism was only concerned with temporal needs and had no interest in 
allowing man to achieve his full potential as a creature of God.22 
These tensions came to a head during the New York City mayoral campaign of 1886.  
The campaign resulted in a clash with lasting consequences between the leader of the 
conservative movement, Archbishop Michael Corrigan, and one of his liberal priests, Father 
Edward McGlynn.  McGlynn was already known to Corrigan as a radical liberal due to the 
priest’s past activism as well as his involvement in a group of ultraliberal priests based in the 
Archdiocese of New York who had dubbed themselves the Accademia.  The race featured the 
campaign of Henry George on the United Labor Party ticket.  George was an outspoken 
proponent of the single tax, which proposed that land should be taxed only on its own value and 
not what is built on it.  Father McGlynn publicly campaigned for George and earned a reprimand 
from his ordinary for his efforts.  Archbishop Corrigan pointed to the socialist tendencies of 
George’s platform and the party he represented as well as the impropriety of a priest involving 
himself so deeply and so publicly in politics.  
Though he had been warned about participating any further in the campaign, McGlynn 
made one more appearance in October of 1886 that resulted in his suspension from active 
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ministry.  The suspended priest was ordered to Rome by both Cardinal Giovanni Simeoni, the 
Prefect of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, and Pope Leo XIII himself.  
McGlynn refused to go and proclaimed that he would never cease to teach that “private 
ownership of land is against natural justice, no matter by what civil or ecclesiastical laws it may 
be sanctioned.”23  He was swiftly excommunicated for his refusal to appear before his pontiff as 
well as his rejection of the Church’s teachings on private property.  McGlynn would not have 
that excommunication lifted until 1892 when he publicly affirmed Leo’s teachings on private 
ownership of property and labor relations.24  It is important to note that his excommunication 
came more as a result of his disobedience, rather than the specific platform he was promoting.  
McGlynn found that to challenge the authority of the American episcopacy, which had steadily 
been gaining strength over the previous four decades, was to fight a losing battle.   
 In response to the increasing unrest amongst the working class and the growing threat of 
socialism, Leo XIII issued in 1891 one of the most influential encyclicals of his pontificate: 
Rerum Novarum.  The pope acknowledged the plight of the lower classes, observing that “a 
small number of very rich men have been able to lay upon the teeming masses of the laboring 
poor a yoke little better than that of slavery itself.”25  Though he denounced the socialist notion 
of communal property, his reasoning was based upon a certain understanding of natural rights 
and communal obligation anchored in divine mandate.  According to Leo, under socialism, the 
state would be the sole legal owner of property.  This particular arrangement, he argued, was in 
violation of a man’s natural right to private property.  “Man precedes the State,” he wrote, “and 
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possesses, prior to the formation of any State, the right of providing for the substance of his 
body.”26  Embedded in this line of reasoning was the assertion that just as man precedes the 
State, so too does the Church.  The natural law that protected the right to private property was 
born of a divine mandate.  The divine source from which that mandate flowed also granted to the 
Roman Catholic Church the sole authority to interpret and impart that law to mankind.  This was 
the foundation upon which the argument for hierarchical authority rested.  The episcopacy held 
through apostolic succession what they believed to be a divine and unquestionable right to define 
the moral law for not only the faithful, but the whole of mankind.27  It was this understanding of 
their divine right to define and enforce the moral law that fueled the vigor with which social 
justice would be pursued in the following century.  Ultimate, real, and lasting social justice could 
only be attained with one eye on the community and the other on obeying the laws of the 
Church.  The idea of achieving individual liberty through social reform that characterized the 
aims of twentieth century reformers was not only unacceptable to conservative Catholics, but, as 
they saw it, potentially dangerous to mankind. 
Leo likewise did not want a leveling of society.  He firmly rejected the notion that the 
rich and poor were locked in inevitable conflict and called, instead, for the classes to exist in 
harmony.  Though a rather idealistic notion, the pope maintained that if all of mankind could 
acknowledge their fellow beings as children of God, the worth of the human could be based upon 
Christian virtues, rather than those dictated by the marketplace.  However, he also urged the 
working class to form unions and to “make every lawful and proper effort” to better their 
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situation in life.28  The belief in an underlying Christian community founded upon timeless moral 
truths that predates both the state and market pervaded the encyclical.  There had always been 
rich and poor, according to the pope, and that reality was not likely to change, even in a socialist 
society.  The attempt to eradicate class differences, however, was not the way to ameliorate these 
differences.  The rich and poor had to realize that they had mutual obligations based on ideas of 
Christian charity, obedience to just authority, and the stewardship of divinely granted gifts.  His 
prescriptions were remarkably illiberal, given the nature of the encyclical.  The outcome of his 
arguments, unintended though it may have been, was the initial spark in a growing commitment 
to social justice that brought conservatives into close quarters with twentieth century liberal 
social reformers.  As the emphasis on negative liberty and a laissez-faire market that 
characterized nineteenth century liberalism transformed into a twentieth century promotion of 
positive liberty assured by the state’s authority, the Catholic doctrine of social justice began to 
more and more reflect the liberal prescriptions for social ailments. 
 Objections to individualism and socialism were mainstays in the conservative critique of 
liberalism.  Religious pluralism formed a third component in their critique.  According to 
conservatives, religious pluralism flowed naturally from the liberal emphasis on individual 
autonomy.  Although the Church’s teachings allowed for man’s free will to choose his own 
beliefs, it added that Catholics could not approve of those choices, much less give the impression 
that the Catholic Church was merely an option among many.  The World Parliament of Religions 
in 1893, in which both Archbishop Ireland and Bishop Keane had participated, was an event that 
conservatives took particular exception to.  The goal of the Parliament was to promote interfaith 
dialogue through highlighting common elements across belief systems.  Conservatives, however, 
argued that it diminished the acceptance of the absolute truth of Catholic teachings.  Bishop 
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McQuaid later condemned their participation, and lamented that the Parliament had succeeded in 
relativizing “the Catholic Church … with its unerring teaching … with every pretense of 
religious denomination from Mohammadanism and Buddhism down to the lowest forms of 
evangelicalism and infidelity.”29  This relativism, and the rejection of hierarchical authority that 
came with it, was the doorway to indifferentism and dangerous compromise. 
 All of these issues—democratization, social leveling, and religious pluralism—came 
together in an 1893 sermon at a Mass celebrating the twenty-fifth anniversary of James Cardinal 
Gibbons’ episcopal consecration.  There, Archbishop Ireland announced to the assembled 
congregation that “[t]o conquer the new world to Christ, the Church herself must be new, 
adapting herself in manner of life and in method of action to the conditions of the new order.”30  
Statements such as these, in conjunction with the continual push for reform to bring the Church 
in line with modern liberal ideology, prompted Leo XIII to issue an apostolic letter in 1895 
directly to the American episcopacy.  Longinqua Oceani contained thinly veiled denouncements 
of Keane’s and Ireland’s emphasis on the spirit of American independence and individualism, as 
well as the need to export this ‘active’ spirit to the Old World.  Leo made sure to point out that 
“[t]he fact that Catholicity with you is in good condition … is by all means to be attributed to the 
fecundity with which God has endowed His Church, in virtue of which unless men or 
circumstances interfere, she spontaneously expands and propagates herself.”31  In this statement, 
Leo clearly claimed for Rome the credit that liberals were claiming on behalf of their American 
heritage, while at the same time criticizing the liberal approach to reform.  He went on to advise 
the bishops that “[Americans] can in no better way safeguard their own individual interests and 
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the common good than by yielding a hearty submission and obedience to the Church.”32  This 
submission to the Church, the pope argued, would allow Catholics to develop a sense of 
community and social obligation that would further the betterment of mankind.  The implication 
of this remark was that liberal ideology did not serve the common good because, in the pope’s 
eyes, it eliminated, or at least diminished, the central force (the Church) around which the 
community was formed. 
 Given the backing of the Pope, conservatives mobilized to suppress the liberals and set 
the course for the Church in America for the next half-century.  In 1895, Monsignor Denis 
O’Connell was pressured to resign as the rector of the North American College, and, in 1896, 
Bishop Keane was likewise pushed to leave his rectorship at Catholic University.  The greatest of 
these events, however, ironically did not even occur on American soil, though it effectively 
ended the nineteenth century Americanism movement.  In 1897, French liberals translated and 
published the 1891 biography of Father Isaac Heacker, the founder of the Paulist Order, which is 
a religious order of priests dedicated to evangelization.33  Though Hecker had been loosely 
associated with American liberals throughout the 1870’s, he was also known and well liked by 
the leading proponents of the conservative camp (Bishop McQuaid even defended Hecker after 
the French translation resulted in misunderstandings of Hecker’s own beliefs).  Father Hecker is 
most remembered for his emphasis on the development of one’s interior spiritual life and his 
work for the conversion of his fellow countrymen.  Though he was somewhat averse to the 
conservative emphasis on the Church as an institution, his criticism never reached the level that it 
was later painted to be.  Abbé Félix Klein, who wrote the introduction for the translated 
biography, offered a far more radical interpretation of the Paulist’s intentions.  In it, Klein 
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presented Hecker as a priest who embodied the spirit of the age and whose spiritual life 
emphasized an active and personal relationship with the Holy Spirit, rather than what Klein saw 
as the passive reception of the Spirit that had characterized the Church of the past.34   
Klein’s explanation of Hecker’s ideology was mistakenly used as the basis for Leo XIII’s 
1899 denunciation of Americanism.  The problem, as the pope saw it, was that Hecker embodied 
the spirit of Americanism that looked to the individual rather than the good of the whole.  Leo’s 
understanding located the “underlying principle” of Americanism in the idea that “in order to 
more easily attract those who differ from her, the Church should shape her teachings more in 
accord with the spirit of the age and relax some of her ancient severity and make some 
concessions to new opinions.”35  While this did seem to address the issues raised by Hecker, 
primarily that the spiritual essence of all persons should be acknowledged prior to their religious 
affiliations, Leo went on to say that Americanists believed that “these concessions should be 
made not only in regard to matters of discipline, but of doctrines in which is contained the 
‘deposit of faith.’”36   
This statement would have been better aimed at the translators of Hecker’s biography 
because whatever the Americanists thought or did, on the whole they did not seek to alter the 
deposit of faith.  Nevertheless, Leo’s condemnation of those who would individually seek to alter 
the Church’s “rule of life” did hit the mark.37  Though the Americanists may not have wanted to 
change doctrine, they did strive to reform the behavior of the Church and its members, not only 
in their own country, but also throughout the entire Catholic population.  This idea of a standard 
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‘rule of life’ mirrored the community-oriented principles of the conservative American bishops.  
Those who made up the Body of Christ were to share one set of principles and behaviors that 
would guide their life.  There principles were also to be firmly based upon those defined by the 
magisterium and therefore grounded in the infallible authority of the Church.38  These shared 
behaviors would create a unified Catholic community able to withstand the errors of the modern 
age.  It was to be only on the Church’s prerogative that the Church reform to modern principles, 
which Leo argued was entirely possible, provided that those principles were consistent with 
Christian morality.  Those who sought to do so as individuals outside of the universal Church, 
whether they were clerics or not, could bring about only temporary – and perhaps erroneous – 
change.  Americanists, as Leo pointed out, pushed for the active pursuit reform, as opposed to 
what they saw as the passivity that had characterized Catholics of the past.39    
  As the Pope’s comments showed, conservatives thought that ideas such as these could 
easily slide into indifferentism and, eventually, unbelief.  Liberals responded with cries that the 
pontiff’s characterization of their movement could not have been more wrong and that none of 
the heresies described in the document could be ascribed to their cause.  After all, they 
acknowledged the existence of a pre-eminent supernatural order.  But conservatives did not see 
the difference between the then current state of liberal thought and what it could become.  In this 
course, they pointed to the ‘decay’ of Protestantism and its ever-quickening descent into 
secularism.  By opening up the ranks of the Catholic community to non-Catholics, and even 
adapting their voice to the culture, conservatives saw liberals as setting a dangerous precedent 
that could one day result in the destruction of the Church on earth.  At the same time, Leo clearly 
stated in his letter that the Church could change, but it could not be the result of individual 
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prerogative.  The conservative dedication to the preservation of the Catholic community 
precluded the option for individual reform that liberal Catholics upheld.  The Church had to act 
as one through slow deliberation and progress, conservatives claimed, and not be pulled swiftly 
along into reform by a select few who were convinced of their cause. 
 Conservative Catholics did not simply reject Americanism without offering an alternative 
solution for the American Church.  Their solution involved falling back upon and promoting 
what they argued were the absolute moral truths of their faith.  And, contrary to the liberal 
accusation that they were out of touch with the modern world, they were fully aware of and 
responsive to modern culture.  Their engagement, however, was not based upon a desire to 
assimilate themselves into that culture.  They were keen to be aware of cultural and political 
developments in order to better uphold their faith in this new environment.  In this context, they 
were far more than a mere foil for the liberal cause.  They held their own beliefs and agendas and 
sought to promote them for reasons that reached beyond a simple rejection of liberal ideology.  
This reality would come to show itself ever more clearly in the conservative involvement in the 
New Deal coalition.  Conservatives were more than simply aware of the shifting sociopolitical 
context in which they lived; they were actively engaged in pursuing the same reforms as their 
twentieth century counterparts.  Out of illiberal foundations came an uneasy alliance with a 
movement that worked for what have come to be seen as some of the most sweeping liberal 













 Leo XIII’s pontificate ended with his death three years after the promulgation of Testem 
Benevolentiae.  His teachings on the state and social justice, especially as found in Rerum 
Novarum, served as a starting point for twentieth-century social reform movements.  The 
teaching grew out of an illiberal foundation and emphasized the need to accept the moral law and 
the authority of the Catholic Church to define it.  However, with the growing liberal social 
reform movements, it became apparent that the two camps could, surprisingly, find points of 
agreement.  While Catholics saw the Church’s authority as a necessary force in pursuing social 
justice, they also operated out of a position that prided the community over the individual.  To be 
sure, this position was at odds with the liberal focus on the ultimate liberty of the individual, but 
it was also this emphasis on community that allowed conservative Catholics to find common 
ground with liberal reformers.  Both factions sought reforms that were designed to better the life 
of man and, in spite of their differing understandings of the “good life,” it was because of this 
shared desire to promote the commonweal that they could form an alliance geared toward social 
reform.    
The language of social justice was used increasingly in support of economic themes, 
particularly the worker’s right to a living wage.  The divide separating liberals from 
conservatives shifted as both argued that the government should enact legislation that would 
promote this end.  Some liberals, Monsignor John Ryan in particular, chafed against the liberal 
label and insisted that their prescriptions were based solidly upon the Church’s teachings on the 
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matter.  His theological conservatism and understanding of social justice as propounded by Leo 
XIII led him to a position as an economic liberal.  He was not a typical example of the Catholic 
conservative faction given his liberal credentials, but his liberalism came from a conservative 
position.  While some conservatives, specifically Father Charles Coughlin as we shall later see, 
accused him of shilling for liberal administrations, the lack of reprimand from Rome suggests 
that he remained well within the scope of Church teachings.  
 In 1906, Ryan’s dissertation was published as a book entitled A Living Wage: Its Ethical 
and Economic Aspects.  In it, he claimed that a worker’s claim to a living wage was based in 
natural rights, not legal.  It is a natural right, he argued, because “it is born with the individual, 
derived from his rational nature, not conferred upon him by a positive enactment.”40  The 
obligation of the state to provide for the individual’s well-being, therefore, is based upon the 
assumption that every man has the natural right to self-perfection and he likewise has the moral 
obligation not to impede his fellow man in the pursuance of that goal.  While he based his 
argument on individual rights, he was not a proponent of the unrestrained individualism that had 
characterized the liberalism of the nineteenth-century.41  His firm belief in absolute moral truths 
put him at odds with his more liberal counterparts who rejected his scholastic moorings, while 
his economic activism based upon individual rights was not entirely consonant with the 
conservative near-complete emphasis on the moral virtues of working for the common good.  
Still, the fact that his liberal economic thought stemmed from Thomistic theology allowed him to 
build a bridge between secular liberals and religious conservatives.  Ryan’s ability to find a home 
in both camps foreshadowed the coming developments in liberalism that focused more on a 
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social program aimed at promoting the good of the individual rather than an absolute individual 
autonomy that left each man to fight for himself. 
 Ryan’s reliance upon theological justifications and timeless moral truths in his 
understanding of economic and social reform reflected a growing disconnect between religious 
and secular reformers.  Members of the Pragmatist school, in particular, like William James and 
John Dewey rejected the notion that these truths could exist a priori.  Basing one’s entire 
understanding of social justice and reform on these unproven truths was therefore, neither 
rational nor practical.  These differences in interpretation prompted Pope Pius X to issue the 
encyclical Pascendi Dominici Gregis in 1907.  He characterized their method of inquiry as one 
in which there “is a fixed and established principle among them that both science and history 
must be atheistic: and within their boundaries there is room for nothing but phenomena; God and 
all that is divine are utterly excluded.”42  The solution to these developments lay in scholastic 
philosophy, and “[o]n this philosophical foundation the theological edifice is to be solidly 
raised.”43  The pope proclaimed that all applicants for professorships at Catholic universities and 
seminaries as well as men discerning vocations should be thoroughly schooled in scholasticism 
as handed down by the Angelic Doctor, Thomas Aquinas.  This reaffirmation of Leo XIII’s 
official endorsement of scholasticism would continue to shape and inform the Church’s 
conception of what constituted sound academic and philosophical principles. 
 These were principles that Monsignor Ryan, even with his liberal credentials in secular 
circles, adhered to.  The growth of the socialist movement in the United States, as well as the 
increasingly organized opposition to it by the Church, resulted in a request that Ryan engage in a 
debate on the merits and deficiencies of socialism with the socialist leader Morris Hillquit.  The 
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debate, which played out in the pages of Everybody’s Magazine, was published as a book 
entitled Socialism: Promise or Menace? in 1914.  Ryan argued that the socialist understanding of 
morality was, in fact, immoral.  According to socialists, Ryan claimed, “the moral law has no 
objective existence apart from the codes of conduct that have prevailed among nations and 
classes throughout history.”44  He further argued that were moral laws mutable, as socialists 
claimed, human beings would not be recognized as having any intrinsic moral worth.  Therefore, 
“society does [a man] no moral wrong when it treats him” as nothing more than an animal to be 
used at will.45  Because of these foundational elements in socialist theory, Ryan argued, the idea 
that the then-current economic system should be overthrown and replaced with a socialist state 
was not only impracticable, but immoral.  Although he did acknowledge that there were social 
ills brought upon by the abuses of the economic system, he flatly denied that the system was 
entirely irreparable.46  Ryan’s debate with Hillquit is a prime example of the ability and 
willingness of Catholics to engage in public discourse while maintaining a grounding in 
traditional Catholic theology.    
 Ryan’s refusal to accept Hillquit’s grim diagnosis of capitalism coupled with his 
conservative theological foundation has confounded efforts to properly categorize his place in 
the political spectrum.  Jay Dolan, for instance, glosses over Ryan’s traditional Thomistic 
approach to theology and, instead, perhaps overemphasizes his commitment to the liberal 
cause.47  Historians have found it difficult to reconcile these seemingly conflicting notions in 
Ryan’s thinking.  If he is released from the constraints of the American political order, however, 
one can better understand how he arrived at his conclusions and why he was reticent to label 
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himself as a liberal.  Ryan drew upon the immutable moral virtues found in Thomistic theology, 
which led him to purvey a vision of social justice that included wage reform, labor protection 
laws, and other economic reforms that came to be associated exclusively with the liberal 
movement.  Ignoring these kinds of inconsistencies and tensions has resulted in an 
historiographical that has consistently failed to acknowledge the paradox in the ability of 
conservative theologians who worked from an illiberal foundation to share a stake in the social 
reform movements led by political liberals.      
 In the aftermath of World War I, Monsignor Ryan authored the Bishops’ Social 
Reconstruction Plan that was published under the auspices of the National Catholic War Council 
(later renamed the National Catholic Welfare Council).  According to the program, “all [of the 
program’s] essential declarations are based upon the principles of charity and justice that have 
always been held and taught by the Catholic Church.”48  These principles of charity and justice 
stemmed from a dedication to the ultimate goal of the preservation of the community over and 
above the liberty of the individual.  It was argued that every effort should be made to integrate 
returning soldiers back into the industrial sector, that wages should at least be sustained at their 
current level, and that the cost of living should be reduced.49   
These recommended reforms, Ryan claimed, would work to correct what they saw as the 
defects of the then-current state of the capitalist system.  Those defects, as they were defined, 
were an “[e]normous inefficiency and waste in the production and distribution of commodities, 
insufficient incomes for the majority of wage-earners, and unnecessarily large incomes for a 
small minority of privileged capitalists.”50  It was argued that social reform should take as its 
“basic proposition that every human being is of inestimable worth, and that legislation should 
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recognize persons as more sacred than property.”51  In essence, all of the prescriptions were 
based upon the assumption that the state should either furnish the basics of life or ensure through 
legislation that all of its citizens could provide basic necessities for themselves.  Though it was 
called a program of social reconstruction, they took pains to point out that they were not 
recommending any kind of radical socialistic reform.  Rather, they claimed, they were merely 
reasserting traditional and long-held doctrine in order to repair, not destroy, the existing 
system.52 
The Program reiterated much of what Monsignor Ryan had been claiming during his 
already two decade long career.  He responded to critics and proponents alike of the Bishops 
Program and argued once again that the program did not represent a radical departure from 
traditional Church teachings.  He further argued, in response to those who claimed that the 
Program was more concerned with economic rather than social reform, that “the economic 
problem seems to be the most important of the social problems.”53  In the context of Church 
teachings, the treatment of wage-earners and the perceived selfishness of wealthy capitalists 
were both a result of the rejection of cardinal virtues.  In addressing these issues, then, they saw 
themselves as responding to the source of the problem.  If the condition of the workers could be 
improved through these reforms, they would be better disposed to further develop their moral 
virtues through religious worship and the family.  The restoration of the principles of the 
Catholic Church in the broader society was the only way to redress injustice.54 
The decade leading up to the Great Depression saw a great resurgence of fierce anti-
immigration, and anti-Catholicism in particular.  A second wave of the Ku Klux Klan helped to 
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lead the charge against Southern and Central European immigrants who were overwhelmingly 
Catholic.  The German American community likewise suffered backlash during and after the war 
due to their German cultural cohesion.  The quota placed upon immigrants that favored certain 
regions of Europe in 1921 and the following Immigration Act of 1924 stemmed the tide of 
unwanted immigration.  Both pieces of legislation helped to highlight the institutionalized 
discrimination against particular racial and ethnic groups.  This discrimination reached new 
heights as the Klan was reborn in Stone Mountain, Georgia, while Southern Protestant religious 
leaders renewed their attacks on the immorality of Catholicism.  These social developments 
seeped into the Democratic Party due to its Solid South constituency; a party that had, over the 
years, earned the loyalty of a vast majority of Northern immigrant Catholics.55 
It was in this atmosphere that Catholics renewed their efforts to prove their American 
credentials.  Monsignor Ryan weighed in on the Church-state debate and forcefully claimed that 
any “reference to the Pope as a temporal sovereign is entirely irrelevant.  [Catholics’] obedience 
to him is entirely in the spiritual order.”56  Articles from Catholic scholars started to litter the 
pages of periodicals, aiming to prove that the origins of democracy, love of country, and true 
freedom lay within the Church and under Christian precepts.  Father John Burke, a Paulist priest 
and editor of the long-running Paulist periodical The Catholic World, claimed that “[t]he love of 
one’s country, of one’s fellow citizens is one of the holiest and highest loves on earth” and that 
these feelings are “not only laudable and obligatory, but they are instruments of human progress 
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and human betterment.”57  The Jesuit priest, Father Moorhouse Millar, in the same issue of the 
Catholic Historical Review no less, argued that the principles of democracy and natural rights as 
enshrined in the Constitution were founded upon Catholic tradition and could be found perfectly 
elucidated in the writings of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas.58    
This tense relationship with non-Catholic Americans affected the 1924 and 1928 
presidential elections.  The Tammany Hall-backed New York governor and Catholic, Alfred 
Smith made a run for the Democratic ticket at the 1924 Democratic National Convention.  Under 
pressure from the Klan, who objected to Smith’s machine politics and anti-Prohibition stance, in 
addition to his religious beliefs, the nomination went to John W. Davis.59  Four years later, 
however, Smith was able to secure the nomination.  Throughout the campaign, his Catholicism 
was pointedly left out of public debate.  Smith eventually lost to Herbert Hoover, though there 
has been debate as to the lengths to which his religion played a part. 
One month after the campaign ended, Monsignor Ryan weighed in on the loss.  He 
agreed that prejudice played a role in the campaign, but Ryan also pointed out that this prejudice 
was also based upon cultural and racial prejudice, perhaps even more so than religious.  
However, Ryan also acknowledged that there were those who argued that Smith’s faith rendered 
him an inadequate candidate.  On the whole, he argued, much of the anti-Catholic remarks were 
born of a misunderstanding of Catholic teachings regarding the relationship between the Church 
and the state.  In Ryan’s opinion, those who voted against Smith solely because he was Catholic  
“are inheritors of a long anti-Catholic tradition, compact of misrepresentation and falsehood 
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[who] have never had adequate opportunity to learn the facts about the Catholic Church.”60  This 
anti-Catholic tradition was embedded in a culture steeped in a distrust of ‘the other.’  Even given 
this allowance, however, Ryan remained openly unhappy about the entire campaign.  “As a 
Catholic,” he wrote, “I cannot be expected to rejoice that some millions of my countrymen 
would put upon me and my co-religionists the brand of civic inferiority.  As an American, I 
cannot feel proud that the spirit of the Sixth Amendment … is thus flouted and violated.”61 
Despite this setback, Monsignor Ryan’s and his fellow Catholics’ commitment to the 
furtherance of social justice through the precepts of the Catholic faith continued unabated.  
Conservatives continued to engage in public debate over the subject and they likewise continued 
to rely upon the gold standard in Catholic teachings on social issues: Leo XIII’s 1891 encyclical, 
Rerum Novarum.  The fortieth anniversary of the landmark encyclical presented Pope Pius XI, 
who succeeded Benedict XV in 1922, with the chance to issue a commemorative encyclical that 
could address the fears and uncertainty of the world in the aftermath of the 1929 stock market 
crash and the ensuing Great Depression.  In the encyclical, Pius reiterated the arguments of 
Rerum Novarum and sketched a history of the economic life that followed it.  Pius characterized 
the then-current state of economic life as having devolved into a “despotic economic 
dictatorship” in which “all economic life has become tragically hard, inexorable, and cruel.”62  
The pontiff likewise condemned socialism and its “more violent section,” Communism.63  He 
claimed that Christianity, and Catholicism more specifically, was completely at odds with 
socialism and that the two were no less than contradictory terms.  The answer in those troubled 
times was not, he suggested, a defection from Christian morals to radical socialism (or anywhere 
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in between).  Rather, it was absolutely necessary that the principles of economics be brought into 
line with Christian morality.  As Pius wrote, any economic reform “will be wholly defective and 
incomplete unless all the activities of men harmoniously unite to imitate and attain … the 
marvelous unity of the Divine plan.”64  Pius was in full support of social reform, but he, as did 
Leo XIII, argued that it needed to emerge out of fidelity to the moral law and the need to 
propagate the faith, rather than a desire to achieve one’s own individual freedom. 
 The election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1932 and his subsequent New Deal reforms 
offered plenty of fodder for Catholic social justice advocates, both congratulatory and critical.  
Monsignor Ryan has been commonly pointed out as one the most ardent supporters of the 
president.  In fact, he himself later reflected that Roosevelt “did more for those who stood most 
in need of social justice than any other man who ever occupied the White House.”65  Ryan 
disapproved of the Court’s nullification of the National Recovery Act and argued “[t]he 
underlying idea and the main provisions of the law represent a nearer approach to the vocational 
group system of economic society, as recommended by Pope Pius XI, than any other piece of 
legislation in this or any other country.”66  Here we can plainly see Ryan make the connection 
between aspects of liberal reform and the prescriptions offered by the Church, which were 
necessarily based upon motivations that contradicted those of the liberal movement.   
Throughout the Roosevelt administration, Ryan faced off with Father Charles Coughlin, 
the infamous Radio Priest of Royal Oak, Michigan.  Coughlin was an early and vehement 
supporter of Roosevelt.  In fact, in a January 1934 speech given by the priest, he proclaimed that 
it was “Roosevelt or ruin” for the nation, and even referred to Roosevelt as “our most beloved 
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President.”67  By the end of that same year, however, Coughlin and his National Union for Social 
Justice turned on the president and the New Deal reforms.  The fact that Coughlin had at his 
disposal literally millions of avid listeners served to make the Radio Priest a real player in the 
political sphere.  His privileged position became very clear in the election of 1936.  Father 
Coughlin trekked across the country, giving stump speeches for Union Party candidate William 
Lemke.  Coughlin lashed out against Roosevelt’s economic reforms and accused him of having 
Communistic tendencies.  Monsignor Ryan’s public radio address in support of the president, as 
well as his condemnation of Coughlin’s rhetoric, prompted Coughlin to divert his attention 
momentarily away from the president and deride Ryan as the “right reverend New Dealer.”68  
Despite Coughlin’s animosity toward both the president and his “ecclesiastical spokesman,” 
Coughlin’s incessant critiques were confined almost entirely to monetary reform, rather than 
Roosevelt’s social welfare policies.69   
The reason for Coughlin’s infamy, and ultimately his undoing, was his stance on fascism 
and Nazism.  He was not alone as a Catholic with sympathetic views toward fascism.  For many 
American Catholics, Mussolini’s greatest triumph was saving a Catholic country from the evil 
clutches of Communism.  The Church’s staunch opposition to Communism as well as its 
consistent emphasis on upholding and obeying authority were very likely to be contributing 
factors in the Catholic support of fascism.  This became especially evident when Il Duce’s 
actions were compared with the anti-clerical regimes in Mexico and Spain.  In addition to the 
German Concordat that the Holy See had signed with Hitler in 1933, which in theory allowed the 
Church to continue its mission unmolested by the Third Reich, the perceived loyalty of 
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American Catholics to their country was becoming ever more tenuous by the day.  As the New 
Republic saw it, “the Vatican had married itself to the ultimate (and most violent) form of 
reaction, namely, fascism.”70  Some Catholics rushed to assure Americans that these claims were 
at least somewhat unfounded.  New York City Democrat, J. J. Lyons, claimed that “the vast 
majority of the 21,000,000 Catholics have been active in progressive democratic movements … 
and are among the most ardent upholders of the liberal American tradition.”71  Lyons statement 
was undoubtedly true, despite what the motivations may have been for those involved in those 
movements. 
Though Father Coughlin had been making vague allusions to his anti-Semitic disposition 
for most of his radio career, it was in 1938 that his statements became all the more disturbing in 
light of the Nazi regime’s treatment of the Jews.  Kristallnacht occurred in the fall that same year 
and Coughlin’s remarks followed right on its heels.  According to the redoubtable Radio Priest, 
“[i]t is the belief, be it well or ill founded, of the present German government that Jews … were 
responsible for the economic and social ills of the fatherland since the signing of the Treat of 
Versailles.”72  For the rest of the broadcast, Coughlin presented evidence that he felt supported 
this claim.  He attempted to vindicate Nazism by claiming that it was merely “a defense 
mechanism against Communism.”73   
His appeals to the promotion of social justice in the same broadcast were tainted by his 
condemnation of what he referred to as Atheistic – a term synonymous with Communist, as far 
as Coughlin was concerned – Jews who, he claimed, were firm supporters of Lenin and Trotsky.  
For three weeks, he spent his one hour weekly radio show attempting to disprove his critics by 
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asserting first, that nothing he had said was based upon anti-Semitic sentiment and, second, that 
according to his unquestionable sources, Jews were in fact supporters of Communism and were 
nothing better than the money changers in the Temple.  Monsignor Ryan sharply denounced 
Coughlin’s on air rants.  Ryan argued that the Radio Priest’s entire broadcast was made up of 
“evil impressions” that “[n]o intelligent person could publicly countenance” and their only 
purpose was to “arouse further ill-feeling against Jewish people in America and to discourage 
feelings of sympathy for the Jews in Germany.”74  Coughlin’s claims, coupled with his virulent 
isolationism, sounded the death knell of his radio show.  Shortly after the United States entered 
the war, and facing possible sedition charges, Father Coughlin signed an agreement with his 
ordinary, Archbishop Edward Mooney, which would prevent him from any and all further 
political activity.75 
The period between the turn-of-the-century and the end of World War II presented some 
of the brightest and the darkest moments in American Catholic history.  The increased influence 
of the Catholic doctrine of social justice as propounded by Leo XIII in Rerum Novarum had 
gained a foothold in even secular movements in the scant decade since it had been promulgated.  
Eager social justice activists like Monsignor John Ryan were acknowledged as masters in their 
field even as they held fast to the teachings as put forward by Leo XII and Pius XI, in particular.  
And finally, many Catholic soldiers distinguished themselves in both World Wars and sought to 
prove that they could be just as patriotic as any other pureblooded American.   
These were also times, however, when any ideological rejection of American principles 
of democracy and freedom were seized upon as being un-American and treasonous.  Increased 
immigration and two foreign wars with nations from whence those immigrants came served to 
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heighten these accusations, particularly toward those who had retained their Old World cultural 
heritage.  Even more detrimental for Catholics in America was when their leaders failed to live 
up to their own system of morals.  Father Charles Coughlin presents the most blatant of these 
failures.  His stance against Communism was consonant with Church teaching, but his 
accusation that it was the Jews who supported and perpetuated what the Church taught were the 
evils of Communism was surely the worst of these transgressions.  Pope Pius XII’s silence 
during the war, whatever his private actions or thoughts may have been, has proven to be a 
permanent blight upon the Vatican’s human rights record.   
These shortcomings, however, did not end the search for social justice or, indeed, the 
search for alternative methods to achieve it.  Even in the midst of a period in which secular 
liberalism appeared to rule supreme, Catholics found ways to promote theories of social justice 
based upon a conservative theological foundation.  This paradox and the political alliance that 
arose out of it became strained in the following decades as liberal Catholics, under the leadership 
of John Courtney Murray, picked up and furthered the goals of nineteenth century Americanists.  
Because liberal Catholics found more space for the tenets of democracy and began to reject the 
idea of an unquestionable hierarchical authority, they became more easy allies with secular 
liberals than did conservatives, who may have had similar views regarding social reform, but 













 The Cold War years found Americans striving to return to normalcy in the aftermath of 
World War II.  The looming Soviet threat behind the Iron Curtain pushed them to redefine and 
strengthen their civic identity in opposition to Communists.  Catholics were forced to reestablish 
their own place in Cold War America and increasingly did so in a way that fell in line with the 
Cold War liberalism that dominated American life in the two decades following World War II.  
As this happened, a very visible liberal shift occurred in the American Church led by the Jesuit 
priest, Father John Courtney Murray.  The shrinking majority of staunch conservatives who, like 
their nineteenth-century predecessors, refused to adapt Catholic principles to American culture 
found themselves facing a country that was almost paranoid in its patriotism.  As Catholic 
liberals continued to find a larger place for the ideals of secular liberalism within their belief 
system, the relationship that had been forged between conservatives and liberal reformers during 
the New Deal years began to deteriorate as the ideological gap widened.  The tone and content of 
the debates between liberals and conservatives reflected these social and political developments.  
Social justice and the common good remained guiding forces, but the theme of the debates 
moved from economics and labor reform to ideas about the Four Freedoms, particularly religious 
freedom, and the nature of the relationship between Church and state.76 
 Two of the most visible, certainly most vocal, and perhaps most misrepresented 
conservative figures in this period were Monsignors Joseph Fenton and Francis Connell.  
Throughout the late 1940’s and 1950’s, Fenton and Connell, who were both professors of 
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Theology at Catholic University, argued for the primacy of the Catholic Church and the pride of 
place it held in the world.  They published at an almost frantic pace; racking up literally hundreds 
of articles and countless other books, pamphlets, and leaflets.  The two priests were instrumental 
in reviving the Americanism debate that had, presumably, been ended in 1895 by Testem 
Benevolentiae.  They firmly rejected the liberal faction’s renewed movement toward 
Americanization and were completely at odds with Father Murray’s emphasis on the strict 
separation of Church and state and his assertion that culture could shape Catholic doctrine.77 
 Both priests were dedicated Thomists and their writings frequently and quite deliberately 
reflected this foundational element of their theology.  Fenton drew heavily upon Aquinas’ 
understanding of divine grace in his explanation of the doctrine extra Ecclesiam nulla salus 
(outside the Church there is no salvation).  According to Fenton, the three theological virtues 
named by Aquinas – faith, hope, and charity – “are the primary expressions of the life of grace 
[and] are themselves the inward principles of unity within the Catholic Church.”78  
Consequently, “[s]ince every person who is saved must possess sanctifying grace at the time of 
death, he must possess a reality which properly belongs to the Catholic Church.”79  Connell 
acknowledged the “unique influence” that Aquinas had upon Catholic theology and explained 
that “[t]he law of the Church obliges teachers of theology in her universities and seminaries to 
expound their science according to the principles enunciated by the Angelic Doctor [Aquinas].”80  
Aquinas’ teachings on justice also formed the core of their ideology.  As justice is one of the 
cardinal virtues, social justice is defined as that which “prompts one to render to society what is 
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due it.”81  This entailed a near complete subordination of one’s own personal desires to the needs 
of the broader community.  “It is the virtue,” Connell wrote, “which prompts one to realize that 
he may not live for himself alone, that as a member of society he must contribute to the common 
welfare.”82  Fenton, Connell, and other conservatives continued to share the concerns of the 
liberal movement for social justice, but just as their New Dealing predecessors had done, they 
relied upon an illiberal foundation to come to their conclusions.  In contrast to the conservatives 
of the early twentieth century, mid-century conservatives found it increasingly difficult to strike 
an accord with their liberal counterparts. 
The argument for the primacy of the Catholic faith against all others was a bold claim to 
be making in a political atmosphere that was deeply suspicious of un-American activities.  The 
two priests were aware of and engaged with this reality.  In the summer of 1946, the Christian 
Herald and Time reprinted passages from a 1943 pamphlet on religious freedom by Monsignor 
Connell.  In the pamphlet, Connell explained that Catholics “hold that any creed which differs 
from that of the Catholic Church is erroneous, and that any religious organization which is 
separated from the Catholic Church lacks the approval and the authorization of God.”83  He 
acknowledged that this belief “presents a striking contrast to the statement we hear so frequently 
today, that everyone has a perfect, inalienable right to practice any form of religion he wishes.”84  
Connell further elaborated the Catholic position to prove that while Catholics believe that there 
exists no objective, supernatural right to practice any other but the Catholic faith, this belief does 
not include civil rights.  “If the word ‘rights’ is taken in the sense of civil rights in the United 
States,” he wrote, “Catholics have no hesitation in stating that all religions should have equal 
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rights.”85  This justification, apparently, did not convince either periodical.  Time asked the 
following question: “Does Catholicism support the first article of the Bill of Rights?”  And 
answered their question thus: “In U.S. practice, yes; in principle, no.”86  This statement can 
perhaps be understood as Time not having drawn a distinction between an ecclesiastical principle 
and a civic principle.  As the magazine saw it, the doctrinal intolerance that the Church required 
did not allow Catholics to uphold the Bill of Rights on principle. 
The following fall, Monsignor Fenton responded to Time’s assessment.  Fenton claimed 
that “[d]isseminating the false notion that … American Catholics [are] ‘in principle’ opposed to 
the Bill of Rights can only serve to encourage that religious underworld which is continually 
engaged in badgering the Catholic faith and which can apparently be satisfied with nothing less 
than an out-and-out, Russian style persecution.”87  Fenton argued that although the Catholic 
Church acknowledged the free will that man possesses in choosing his religious affiliation, he 
has no moral right to practice any faith other than Catholicism.  Fenton maintained that “since 
there is a real and objectively manifest divine precept that all men live within the Catholic 
Church, it is objectively a moral wrong for any American or, for that matter, for anyone else, to 
adopt a non-Catholic religion.”88  The fact that a man has a natural right to religious freedom 
refers only to man’s free will.  “[E]very one has a natural, God-given right to accept and to 
practice whatever form of religion appeals to him individually,” Fenton maintained, but “this 
does not give him a genuine right to do so.”89  Man would be abusing that free will should he 
knowingly choose to reject the Catholic faith.  Fenton was careful to point out, as Connell had 
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done three years earlier, that every man has a civil right to pursue any religious affiliation he 
wishes, but it is also true, he argued, that “civil law makes no attempt to enforce the divine 
precept” that man breaks the moral law when he does not belong to the Catholic Church.90  
These arguments were based upon the understanding that divine law always and everywhere 
supercedes civil law because of its moral and spiritual superiority.  And to deny that moral law 
would be to deny the virtues that it bestowed upon its adherents.  These were the virtues, which, 
under the conservative Catholic understanding, were the only path to the true promotion of the 
common good. 
By contrast, John Courtney Murray put forward a depiction of the relationship between 
Church and state as well as freedom of worship that stood in stark contrast to that of both Fenton 
and Connell.  It was also a position that allowed him easier access to good relations with secular 
liberals.  While Fenton held that “it cannot possibly be a good thing … to have any State or civil 
society to fail to acknowledge and to reverence the Church as God’s kingdom on earth,” Murray 
wished to detach the direct link between the power of the state and that of God and the Church.91  
The state was not conceived as a creature of God; rather, its power was “ordained of God, the 
author of nature, but deriving from the people.”92  Along these lines, Murray also advocated the 
separation of the Church and state.  In connection with his position on the need for the Church to 
adapt to the current political reality, he argued that the idea of a state-sanctioned religion was 
simply an example of the adaptation of ahistorical principles to historical reality.  “[T]he 
institution of the state-church,” Murray wrote, “was an adaptation to a particular historical 
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context [and] does not represent a permanent and unalterable exigence of Catholic principles.”93  
According to Murray, this arrangement was no longer applicable to modern culture.  Instead, he 
argued that “[democracy] is presently man’s best, and possibly last, hope of human freedom.”94  
This argument hearkened back to the Americanist claim that the burden of salvation had been 
transferred from Europe to the United States.  This link was perhaps made most clear when 
Murray wrote that the Church should explore “the possibilities of a vital adaptation of Church-
State doctrine to the constitutional structure, the political institutions, and the ethos of freedom 
characteristic of the democratic state.”95 
This proposal for the American Church brought him in line with both the nineteenth 
century Americanists as well as the desire for conformity pushed by the broader American 
society.  The very idea that the Church “must undergo a vital adaptation to the realities given at 
the moment” stood in near complete opposition to conservative opinion.96  This was surely the 
most objectionable component of liberal ideology to conservatives.  As had been the case in the 
nineteenth century Americanism debate, conservatives argued that this kind of reform, as well as 
the new interpretation of Church history that Murray put forward, suggested that reform was 
driven by the will of man and that it relied upon individual action to achieve it.  The need to 
adapt to man-made institutions that liberals advocated seemed to imply that the divinely 
instituted Church was subject to the transient trends of the temporal order.   
It is true that Murray did not argue that the principles of the Church were subject to 
change, but conservatives on the whole did not distinguish between abstract principles and their 
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practical application.97  The validity of the teachings of the Church was, according to 
conservatives, not subject to a constantly shifting secular moral order.  For conservatives, the 
assertion that some principles did not apply to certain time periods denied the Church’s 
immutable moral authority, an authority that had time and time again reaffirmed the centrality of 
Thomistic theology in its understanding of morality and virtue.  This theology was the well from 
which conservatives drew their conception of social justice and it was the foundation upon which 
their claims rested.  This theology was also, by secular standards, highly illiberal.  It stressed 
obedience to authority and prizing the good of the community over the liberty of the individual.  
Murray’s argument allowed for a larger place of the individual and included more than a 
reluctant acceptance of religious freedom.  Indeed, Murray would later play an integral role in 
the promulgation of the Second Vatican Council document on religious freedom, Dignitatis 
Humanae.  The Council proclaimed that there did, in fact, exist an individual right to religious 
freedom and did not include the caveat that Catholics must on no account approve of another 
individual’s choice to not be Catholic.  
The conservative position on reform led Monsignor Connell to the conclusion that 
Murray’s thesis needed to be reported to Rome.  In 1953, he did just that.  Shortly after his 
appointment as the Pro-Secretary of the Holy Office, Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani gave a speech 
in honor of Pope Pius XII on the subject of Church-State relations.98  The cardinal explicitly 
referenced the debates that had occurred between Murray and his conservative counterparts 
throughout the late 1940’s and 1950’s in the pages of The American Ecclesiastical Review.  He 
named Murray’s argument “the liberalizing thesis” and clearly sided with the position of Fenton 
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and Connell.99  In a letter sent to Connell the following year, Ottaviani agreed that Murray’s 
claims affected “the common good” and he assured the priest that he saw it as his “duty to act … 
for the protection of the truth and for the defense of Catholic thought.”100  As Ottaviani and 
American conservatives saw it, Murray’s prominence in theological circles created a dangerous 
situation.  They were sure that the Jesuit’s thesis contained within it corruptive elements that 
could damage the faith.  Later that very year, the Holy See censured Murray based on what the 
Holy Office saw as four erroneous propositions in his writings.  These propositions referred 
primarily to Murray’s claim that democracy was at present the most ideal form of government 
and that full religious liberty should be embraced rather than simply tolerated by Catholics.  
Murray was strongly advised to cease writing about his ‘liberalizing thesis.’  It is at this point in 
the Jesuit’s career that the historiography tends to lament Murray’s Roman censure.  Many write 
of him as having been attacked and silenced by Rome, while Fenton and Connell worked 
Stateside to sully his integrity and reputation.101 
The censure proved to be, contrary to the commonly accepted narrative, less than 
effective in silencing Father Murray.  He continued to argue that institutions had to adapt to 
historical realities, but he carefully avoided explicitly including the Church in these arguments.  
Much of his focus was shifted from prescriptions for the Church in society to explanations of 
American civil society and what the place of religion was within it.  He extolled the virtues of 
democracy and religious freedom, but was able to keep within the bounds of his censure because 
he stopped short drawing out a full plan of action for the American Church.  The Church did, to 
                                                 
99
 Alfredo Ottaviani, “Church and State: Some Present Problems in the Light of the Teaching of Pope Pius 
XII,” quoted in Ibid., 32. 
100
 Ottaviani to Connell, Rome, March 31, 1954, quoted in Ibid., 35. 
101
 See Dolan, In Search of An American History, 160-162; McGreevy, Catholicism and American 
Freedom, 207-209; Komonchak, “Catholic Principle and the American Experiment,” 41. 
 47 
some extent, incorporate Murray’s argument about individual religious freedom, but the priest 
himself felt that it did not go far enough.102 
As the decade wore on, the Church became ever more accepted in liberal circles.  Aside 
from its own developments, growing anti-Communist sentiment served to deflect attention away 
from the Catholic threat.  No longer, on the whole, was it seen as the totalitarian threat to 
American democracy that was just as dangerous as the Red Menace.  The Church’s work toward 
racial equality likewise placed Catholics amongst the vanguard of liberal activists.  Even inside 
the Church, the liberal base swelled alongside these developments.  They began to argue against 
the doctrinal intolerance that priests like Fenton and Connell had championed throughout their 
careers.  The subjective and purely civil freedom of worship that conservatives had supported 
throughout the foregoing seven decades was replaced with an emphasis on the absolute freedom 
of worship that did not include the explicit warning that it was an objective moral wrong to 
belong to any faith outside of the Catholic Church. 
For conservatives, these were problematic changes.  While they were not opposed to 
recognizing human dignity, they were opposed to doing so at the expense of maintaining the 
absolute truths of the Church and the obligation of man to believe in those truths.  To do so, they 
believed, would be to risk a clear sense of Catholic identity and compromise the legitimacy of 
the deposit of faith and the magisterium’s authority.  They saw liberals as wanting to impose the 
liberal democratic model upon the hierarchical Church.  The Second Vatican Council thus came 
to be understood by many conservatives as a liberal mission to modernize doctrine, rather than 
modernize the way in which doctrine was imparted, and to force the Church into reforms that 
would make it more adaptable to modern cultural values.  Liberals saw the conservative 
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resistance to such reforms as purely reactionary and based upon an antiquated understanding of 
the Church’s place in the world.  Conservatives, on the other hand, argued that it rejected the 
Church’s role in shaping culture and instead promoted the shaping of the Church by culture, 
which, as it happens, was exactly what Father Murray had been arguing for throughout the 
preceding decade. 
From the latter half of the 1950’s through to the Second Vatican Council in 1963, the 
American Church experienced a massive liberal shift.  This shift entailed an effort to mould the 
structure and function of the Church to the American democratic model.  This was, for many 
historians and liberal contemporaries, the vindication of the Americanism movement as 
envisioned by Archbishop John Ireland and his fellow nineteenth century liberals and, more 
recently, of Father Murray.  It was, for conservatives, a potentially dangerous compromise of 
long-held Catholic truths and traditions.  As they saw it, their objections were not based upon a 
reactionary nostalgia for the clericalism and ostentatious trappings of the ‘preconciliar’ (that is to 
say, the period prior to Vatican II) Church.  They were based upon a theological understanding, 
rooted in their Thomistic training, of the need for community and justice found through the 
infallible teachings of the Church, not the secular liberal movements that placed the foundation 
of their reforms in individualism and democratic theory.  The conservative insistence upon 
holding steadfastly to their illiberal foundation highlighted the ever-increasing agreement 
amongst religious and secular liberals and served to widen the gap between conservatives and 
liberal reformers. 
Conservatives did not, however, want to completely distance themselves from these 
debates.  They understood themselves to be working toward bringing about a new acceptance of 
the moral law that they felt was better suited to meeting the goals that liberal social reformers 
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had set.  The promotion of the common good under the moral law as defined by the Catholic 
Church had to be found in the striving for the true end of man; an end that required 
transcendence above the temporal order to the supernatural.  The only way, conservatives 
argued, an individual could be truly inspired to work for this common good, the ultimate good, 
of man was within the framework and system of morals as laid down by Thomas Aquinas and 
taught by the Roman Catholic Church.  After the Council, however, the American Church came 
to be dominated by a liberal majority that was much more inclined to carve out space for the 
individual, even in a Church that remained to be hierarchical.  The liberal rejection of authority 
and growing emphasis on a democratic model that allowed for a much larger role for the laity in 
the guiding the mission of the Church – whether it be through pastoral councils or the 
skyrocketing number of parish-based and lay-led apostolates – effectively severed the ties that 
had been made between liberals and conservatives in the first three decades of the twentieth-
century.   
The paradox, however, remained.  Conservatives continued to maintain an essentially 
liberal position on social and economic reform that was based upon illiberal ideas about authority 
and individual freedom.103  This reality has been overshadowed by an historiography that has 
focused exclusively on the illiberality of conservative ideology (or, in the case of John Ryan, 
glossed over the illiberal roots of a liberal icon) without acknowledging that liberal conclusions 
could be, and were, drawn out of that ideology.  The liberal narrative has likewise failed to grasp 
the fact that liberal Catholics continued to accept liberalism as a dominating American ideal, in 
spite of the clearly illiberal times in which many of them lived.  The historiography has ignored 
these tensions in favor of simplicity and has wound up purveying a vision of American Catholic 
                                                 
103
 Though it must be pointed out that issues like abortion and contraception were not included in their 
platform.  For many conservatives, these matters were of a moral nature and, as such, the state had no place in their 
regulation. 
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history colored by a liberal triumphalism in contrast to a reactionary conservatism that was 
incapable of finding a place in the American cultural landscape. 
 
whose ideology mirrored the conservative emphasis on community and the common 


























 The history of the Catholic Church in America has been fraught with tension and 
division, both amongst the faithful themselves and with the broader American culture.  Tensions 
that began with a massive influx of Irish immigrants in the 1840’s grew to a full-fledged divide 
over the place of those immigrants in American life by the 1890’s.  The conservatives in this era 
faced off with illiberal political trends as well as an Americanism movement that argued for the 
need to Americanize the Church and its immigrant faithful in order to fall in line with these 
trends.  Conservatives did not reject this argument because they were opposed to the very idea of 
America.  They rejected it because they felt that the liberal ideology in American political culture 
and its emphasis on individual autonomy was at odds with the teachings of their Church.  
Conservatives were not ignorant to the arguments of religious or secular liberals and did not see 
themselves as arguing for the building of impermeable walls between Catholics and American 
society in order to enclose themselves and the faithful inside a Catholic ghetto.  They wanted to 
hold onto strong Catholic ideals in an effort to promote in American society the moral law and 
its emphasis on the common good.       
 This history was also one of a perplexing paradox, one that existed on multiple levels.  
The liberal Catholics who wanted to ‘Americanize’ the Church fully believed liberalism to be the 
dominant American ideology.  They struggled to incorporate the principles of democracy and 
liberalism into a Church that was very much at odds with such ideas and within a culture that 
was far from liberal itself.  During periods of heavy immigration, American society closed in 
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upon itself and adopted a position that highly prized an homogenous culture, whether that was in 
terms of race, ethnicity, or religious affiliation.  In spite of this, liberal Catholics purveyed a 
vision of American culture that was geared toward promoting an individualistic active spirit, a 
spirit that would be the perfect vehicle with which the Old World Church could be reformed.  As 
they argued, once the Church could accept this necessary measure for reform, they would be 
welcomed with open arms by Americans.  Total acceptance of hierarchical authority and 
doctrinal intolerance were outmoded viewpoints that only served to sever the Church from 
modernity.  Modernity, for liberals, was liberalism and democracy, not passive piety and 
hierarchical rule.        
Conservatives rejected liberalism outright, whether it was the dominant political ideal or 
not.  For them, it was simply not compatible with Catholic teachings on the Church’s infallible 
authority to define the norms of the community.  To uphold the stability of the community, 
society had to submit to the Church’s authority and not allow itself to define its own law outside 
of the Church.  This highly illiberal position ironically led to a very deep commitment to social 
justice, particularly in the wake of Rerum Novarum.  Social justice had existed as a defined 
tradition in the Church since Aquinas, but it was Leo XIII’s articulation of the tradition in 
conjunction with socioeconomic conditions that were in deep need of reform that led to the hold 
it took upon Catholics.  It proved to be a pivotal moment in Church history, and it made a very 
lasting mark upon American Catholics in particular.  While it may seem illogical that such 
illiberal foundations could lead to what are seen as liberal conclusions, it becomes clear once one 
looks at the reasoning behind the Church’s emphasis on obedience to authority and its wariness 
toward many aspects of liberal ideology.  Individual autonomy, in the mind of the Church, would 
only lead to fragmentation and disorder.  Obedience to what the Church claims is its infallible 
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authority creates for the community a stable foundation out of which flows immutable truths 
designed to promote the common good.  Despite the fact that twentieth-century liberals had 
come to realize that unrestrained individualism was not a practical path to the common good, 
conservatives disagreed with the notion that the community’s ultimate goal should be the liberty 
of the individual.  For conservatives, the community had to take precedence over the individual 
and the boundaries of that community had to be defined by the Church.   
And yet, despite these deep-rooted divisions, both liberals and conservatives could agree 
on the necessity for economic and social reform, and even some of the methods through which to 
achieve it.  All sides argued that the government had to do more to protect those who had no 
bargaining power in the workplace.  While this presented a definite shift in the liberal approach 
to government interference in society, for conservatives, it was little different from relying upon 
the Church to enforce the moral law.  These reforms were needed to better the lives of workers 
so that they make more room for spiritual development.  Supporting social reform, then, was a 
way to combat vice and injustice so that the moral law could prevail.  In this way, conservatives 
operated out of an illiberal foundation and, indeed, had ultimately illiberal goals.  The paradox 
lay in the fact that both conservatives and liberals identified the same methods as a mean to 
further their own ideological goals. 
Following the New Deal years, conservatives did not cease to promote the Church’s 
social justice tradition.  However, it became clear that Catholic liberals found themselves more 
able to find space for the individual in their ideology and, as such, became a more attractive 
option for a political alliance.  Conservatives were unwilling to follow in their footsteps and 
remained unwavering in their understanding of religious freedom and the relationship between 
the Church and the state.  Their staunch opposition to the Americanization of the Church, in 
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conjunction with a rapidly growing liberal Catholic movement, led to the deterioration of the 
uneasy coalition that had sprung up in the mutual quest for social reform.  The fact remains, 
however, that this coalition did indeed exist, despite the wildly different ideological traditions of 
its members.  But how is it that secular liberal reformers and staunchly conservative Catholics 
could identify the same methods to achieve their goals?  It is a paradox that seems determined to 
go unexplained.  It is also a paradox that contributes to the tension that has characterized the 
history of Catholicism in America.  The story of the Old Faith in the New World remains to be 
fully unpacked by historians and that can only be achieved if conflicts and inconsistencies are 
identified, even if they are inexplicable or illogical.  The current place of the Church in America 
is not without tension and controversy and its past is no less so.  To simplify it in order to avoid 
unanswerable questions results in a history devoid of the complications that seem to come part 
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